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Abstract—Many contributions use the degree distribution of
IP-level internet topology. However, current knowledge of this
property relies on biased and erroneous measurements, and so it
is subject to much debate. We introduce here a new approach,
dedicated to the core of the internet, which avoids the issues
raised by classical measurements. It is based on the measurement
of IP-level neighborhood of internet core routers, for which we
design and implement a rigorous method. It consists in sending
traceroute probes from many monitors distributed in the
internet towards a given target router and carefully selecting
the relevant information in collected data. Using simulations, we
provide strong evidence of the accuracy of our approach. We
then conduct real-world measurements illustrating the practical
effectiveness of our method. This constitutes a significant step
towards reliable knowledge of the IP-level degree distribution of
the core of the internet.
I. INTRODUCTION
”A very general but largely ignored fact about Internet-
related measurements is that what we can measure in an
internet-like environment is typically not the same as what
we really want to measure (or what we think we actually
measure).”[1] This is particularly true for traceroute mea-
surement of the topology. Maps are obtained by merging the
paths obtained from a limited number of monitors to many
targets. It has been shown that doing so leads to intrinsically
biased views [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. The classical assumption
is that the bias on observed properties becomes less signifi-
cant when the sample grows. However, the relevance of this
assumption is far from trivial and it was even proved that it
is false in some cases at least [7].
In addition, traceroute outputs themselves contain
much erroneous information. This may be due to mis-
configured routers, route dynamics, or circuit networks. Some
of these errors are evidenced and discussed in [1], [8], [9],
[10], [11]. Correcting such errors is extremely difficult in
general, and often impossible. In particular, this is the case
of erroneous links induced in tarceroute outputs by load-
balancing on the network. The specificity of our approach
allows us to tackle this problem.
We explore here a new approach for the measurement of
the degree distribution of the IP-level topology of the core
of the internet, which is one of its main properties. This
approach does not rely anymore on the collection of a large
sample obtained by merging traceroute outputs. Instead,
we propose to select internet core routers, rigorously estimate
their degrees, and infer the degree distribution from these. The
success of this approach relies on our ability to get at least one
interface of each IP-level neighbor of the router. Then, using
anti-aliasing methods [12], [13], [8], [9], one may obtain the
list of routers in the target neighborhood. It must be clear that
the selection of internet core routers as well as anti-aliasing
are non trivial issues. We do not address these problems here,
which we consider as future work, and focus on the key point
of our measurement approach: obtaining an interface of each
neighbor of the target.
Contribution
We design a rigorous method for the measurement of the
neighborhood of internet core routers. We show its validity
by simulations, and its practical effectiveness by a sample
measurement. We thereby settle an important basis for reliable
estimation of the degree distribution of IP-level internet topol-
ogy, independent of any biased sample and robust to erroneous
traceroute information due to load-balancing.
II. OUR APPROACH
The classical approach to estimate the degree distribution of
IP-level internet topology consists in observing it on a map of
this topology. Such maps are obtained by merging the outputs
of many traceroute measurements (each such measure-
ment being supposed to give an IP-level route, and so a path
in the corresponding topology). The underlying assumptions
are both that errors which may occur in traceroute mea-
surements may be neglected, and that the degree distribution
observed on large maps is similar to the actual one. However,
the validity of both assumptions is far from established, and
many results even seem to show that they are invalid: the
measurement method in itself produces biased data [2], [3],
[4], [5], [6], [7], and route dynamics and other internet features
lead to many errors in observed routes [1], [8], [9], [10], [11].
The main objective of our approach is to get rid of the
issues raised by the map construction. Instead, we focus on
the measurement of the strict information needed to observe
the property of interest. In our case, we aim at obtaining the
exact degree of a given node of the internet. Doing so for
many random nodes opens the way to rigorous inference of
the actual degree distribution. Clearly, the more nodes we
consider, the more precise the inference may be. However,
even inference from a relatively small sample would lead to
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Fig. 1. Left: an example of target t in the core. The routes coming from
the set of monitors goes through all of its neighbors. Right: an example of
target t′ in the border. Only the neighbor of t′ accessible from the core is
discovered. Monitors are represented by blue squares. Nodes in the core are
bigger than those in the border. The links of the routes from the monitors to
the target are black, while other links are gray.
significant improvement of the current situation, if the degrees
in the sample are correctly measured.
In addition, our approach reveals other key advantages.
First, it clarifies our understanding of the limitations of the
measurement process. While [14] argue on the impact of
adding sources or destinations in the classical approach, this
impact is quite clear with our approach: adding sources
increases the precision of our estimation of target degrees,
and adding destinations increases the representativity of the
sample of nodes used to infer the distribution.
Another benefit of our approach is that the operation of
estimation of the degree of a given target, or a set of targets, is
atomic: at the end of such an operation, we instantaneously get
the desired degrees and we can conduct a new measurement
on a different set of destinations. This is not possible with
classical measurements which cannot merged only part of the
collected traceroute outputs: the result is available only
at the end of the measurement, which must last long in order
to get a large enough sample of the graph.
With our approach, repeating the atomic measurement op-
eration, we can collect degrees of a set of targets as wide as
desired, in order to infer the degree distribution. Moreover, as a
round of measurement is short, it is not too sensitive to changes
in the network topology. Indeed, these changes artificially
increase the degree of affected nodes by making them appear
adjacent both to their earlier neighbors and to their newer
ones. On the opposite, because they require long observation
periods, classical measurements are quite sensitive to these
changes of the topology. At last, note that the time locality
of our atomic measurement operation makes it possible to
observe changes in the degree distribution along time, without
suffer from changes of the topology.
In order to get the degree of a given router, called target,
we launch ICMP traceroute probes1 from many monitors
towards this target. The last hop of each traceroute gives in
principle an interface (IP address) of an IP-level neighbor of
the target. The key objective here is to ensure that we reach
the target passing through all of its neighbors. See Figure 1
(left).
1The choice of ICMP was shown to induce less complaints by network
administrators, and to have no significant impact on our measurements.
Classically, internet IP-level topology is divided into two
parts: the core and the border. The core is defined as the
network obtained by removing all trees attached to it (i.e.
iteratively removing all nodes with only one link). The border
is the union of these removed trees. Here, we focus on the
degree distribution of the core of the internet. While the tree
structure of the border simply carries traffic from end-hosts
up to the core and from the core down to end-hosts, the core
is the part of the network responsible for non-trivial routing.
Having a precise knowledge of the structure of this part of
the topology is crucial for many aspects, such as security and
quality of service. Our method is precisely dedicated to the
measurement of the degree distribution of this central part of
the network.
Note that it is inappropriate to observe degrees of nodes
in the border. Indeed, if the target is in a tree structure (see
Figure 1 (right)), the routes coming from the monitors will
arrive to t′ from its higher level neighbor in the tree, namely
node a in this case. Then, the degree of t′ will be evaluated
to one though it is much greater: it has many links to the end-
hosts it provides traffic to, which we have no chance to reach
with our monitors. Although, the rigorous measurement and
knowledge of the border part of the network is also of prime
interest, and it should be achieved using methods specifically
designed for this goal.
Opposite to the case of a border node, if the target is in
the core, we can expect to reach it passing through all of its
neighbors (see Figure 1 (left)). The crucial point for this is that
the set of monitors we use is numerous enough and distributed
enough in the internet so that we arrive to the target coming
from all directions. To this purpose, we use PlanetLab nodes
[15]. PlanetLab provides a set of 952 machines made available
to researchers by 483 institutions (mainly research labs) widely
distributed in the world.
It must be clear that if the target has a low number of
neighbors, say for instance 2 or 3, then we will certainly
discover all of them with these monitors. On the contrary, we
cannot observe more neighbors than the number of monitors,
and more generally if the target has many neighbors we will
certainly miss some. The key question then is to determine the
limit between the two situations: how many monitors do we
need compared to the degree of the target, or equivalently,
given a number of monitors, up to what degrees are we
able to capture the whole neighborhood? We explore these
questions with simulations, in next section, and we obtain
strong evidences of the fact that, up to a relatively large degree,
our approach performs very well.
III. SIMULATIONS
In order to validate our approach, we construct an artificial
graph, then select random nodes in it which will serve as
monitors, and simulate traceroute measurements from
these monitors to all other nodes (targets). In this way, we
are able to observe the quality of the estimation of the
degree of each possible target. We have to choose on which
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Fig. 2. Degree distributions observed in our simulations on Poisson graphs
with average degree 20. Left: one million nodes. Right: ten million nodes. In
both cases, we plot the true degree distribution (full) and the ones observed
with 25, 100, 200 and 500 monitors.
graphs we should perform the simulations, and how to model
traceroute measurements.
Following classical modeling approaches [2], [6], sup-
ported by empirical observations [6], we will assume that
traceroute delivers a random shortest path. This makes the
simulation simpler to run and interpret, while having limited
impact on the results presented here.
As a first case of study, to keep simulations simple, we
use here random graphs with Poisson degree distribution (see
Figure 2). Clearly, it would be desirable to conduct simulations
on other graph models closer to internet topology such as
random powerlaw graphs or HOT models. This is one of the
main perspective of the simulation part of our work. Poisson
graphs have two parameters: their size and their average
degree. Clearly, we can difficultly consider graphs of a size
similar to the actual internet. Instead, we use two graphs, with
respectively one million and ten millions nodes, in order to
investigate size effects. We conducted simulations with various
average degrees. We only present the case with average degree
20, which is large compared to the assumed average degree of
internet topology, and therefore should not favor our approach.
The results with different average degrees are identical to those
presented here.
In [2], Lakhina et al. investigated, using similar simulations,
the performance of the classical method, consisting in merging
paths obtained between a set of sources and a set of desti-
nations. They generated random graphs with 100 000 nodes
and average degree 15, having Poisson degree distribution,
and merged random shortest paths obtained from 10 sources
to 1 000 destinations. Their results show a striking fact: the
observed degree distribution they obtained is not a Poisson
distribution but rather looks like a powerlaw distribution. This
fact was analytically proven in [3] in the case of a unique
source. This shows that the observation of a set of destinations
from a source is intrinsically biased toward heterogeneous
distributions. This raises the question of knowing whether the
degree distribution observed by classical methods reflects the
degree distribution of the network or that of the measurement
process.
Figure 2 shows degree distributions obtained for various
numbers of monitors. As expected, it appears clearly that
having a low number of monitors leads to erroneous estima-
tions. More precisely, using 25 monitors, the average observed
degree is lower than 15, while the actual one is 20. This is
not surprising, as the number of monitors itself is close to the
average degree. On the other hand, it is very interesting to
note that even with a low number of monitors, the observed
distribution is still Poisson. Though its parameters appears
modified, our method qualitatively preserves the shape of the
distribution. This is a major improvement compared to the
classical approach.
When the number of monitors grows, the estimation rapidly
becomes much better. With 200 monitors, the degree distri-
bution is very well estimated, and there is no improvement
when increasing this number. It is remarkable that even for the
nodes with the largest degrees (30 and more), the observation
is excellent. For both graphs, the observed maximal degree is
only two units less than the original one (43 instead of 45 and
46 instead of 48), and 97% of nodes having degree at least 30
are estimated to have such a degree (89% for nodes of degree
at least 35). It therefore seems that, at least for such degrees
and for graphs of this size, having a few hundreds monitors
(like in PlanetLab) is sufficient.
One may however argue that the internet is much larger
than the graphs used here. But the simulations clearly show
a striking fact: the graph size has little, if any, impact on
the results. This fits the intuition that the key point is the
target degree, not the graph size: as long as monitors are
well distributed in the graph, the size has limited impact on
our ability to reach the target by all its neighbors, provided
that the number of these neighbors is reasonably small. We
consider the formal analysis of this empirical observation as
an interesting perspective, as well as the study of other classes
of graphs, in particular some with very high degree nodes.
Finally, simulations presented here clearly show that our
method is relevant and is free from the bias highlighted in
[2], [3]. They also indicate that the method discovers all
neighbors of nodes with a reasonable number of monitors
when their degree is not too large. Then, the number of
monitors available in PlanetLab should be sufficient in most
cases. Further investigation in Section V shows that cases
where they are not sufficient seem to be extremely rare.
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Fig. 3. Left: a case where routes between m and t have have different
lengths, leading to the observation of fake neighbors. Right: a case where
routes all have the same length, in this case no fake neighbors is produced by
traceroute. Numbers are identifiers of the different interfaces of a router,
and we denote by ai the ith interface of router a.
IV. FAKE NEIGHBORS DETECTION
An important issue in traceroute measurements is the
errors induced by dynamics in the routes [1], [10], [11]: if the
route from a monitor to a target changes during a running
of traceroute, then false links may be observed. One
may guess that such events are quite rare, but because of
the generalization of load-balancing they are actually very
frequent, see [10], [11].
For example, in Figure 3 (left), there are different routes
from monitor m to target t. Then, conducting a traceroute
measurement from m to t, it may happen that the second
packet (TTL=2) takes the upper route, while the third one
(TTL=3) takes the bottom route. In this case, the output of
traceroute is the route m–a1–b1–t, which produces the
false link b1–t. Similarly, in the case of Figure 3 (right),
because of load-balancer a, if the route changes during a
traceroute measurement, it may produce route m–a–b1–
e1–t, or route m–a–d1–c1–t, then delivering false link b1–e1
or d1–c1. The output of traceroute is a mix of all possible
routes.
Nevertheless, there is a big difference between the two
configurations depicted on Figure 3. In the left configuration,
routes have different lengths and fake neighbors appear (that
is, false links involving the target). On the opposite, in the right
configuration, routes have the same length and we observe the
actual neighbors of the target. This is a general fact: changes
in the routes followed by packets have no impact on observed
neighbors of the target as long as all routes have the same
length. This is due to the fact that, in such cases, even though
traceroute may mix the routes, every node will always
appear at the same distance both from the monitor and from
the target. In particular, nodes in penultimate position on a
route are neighbors of t, which is our only concern in the
present context. Note that the possibility of distinguishing
configurations producing fake neighbors takes advantage of
the specificity of our approach, which concentrate on the last
hop. It does not allow to avoid false links anywhere else along
the routes.
Then, our method to detect pairs m, t likely to produce fake
neighbors is to send several probes and examine the length
of produced routes. This raises the question of bounding the
probability that there exist routes of different lengths that
we did not detect, depending on the number of probes we
sent. We did not address the question in its whole generality.
Nevertheless, it is worth studying the case where there are
exactly two routes of lengths l1 and l2 with l1 < l2, having
equal probability to be followed by traceroute packets.
When a packet with TTL=l1 is sent to target t, it follows one of
the two routes. If it follows the shortest one, it arrives to t and
the route of length l1 is discovered. If the packet follows the
longest route, it does not reach t and traceroute outputs a
route of length greater than l1. It follows that the probability
that n probes give only routes of the same length is bounded
by 2× (1/2)n. In this case at least, it decreases exponentially
with the number of probes, and only few probes should be
necessary in order to detect the existence of two different route
lengths.
V. SAMPLE MEASUREMENT
In this section, we show how to implement our method and
we give the result of a measurement conducted on a random set
of targets. This must not been considered as an estimation of
the degree distribution of any set of routers of internet. Indeed,
as we mentioned previously, we did not implement any anti-
aliasing technique nor any selection method for routers in the
core of internet. These issues are key perspective and we let
them for future work. The goal of this section is to demonstrate
the practical effectiveness of our method and to show how we
can clean obtained data without loosing information.
A. Measurement setup
As we already mentioned, we used PlanetLab nodes as
monitors for our measurement. Although these machines may
not be uniformly distributed in the internet, we will assume
that they are dispersed enough for our purpose. One may argue
that this is not the case because planetlab nodes lies mainly on
academic networks. But still, destinations we choose are not on
such networks and these networks have many connections to
others all over the world. As shown by simulations, the critical
point of comparison is between this number of outgoing
connections and the degree of target routers. Nevertheless,
clearly, widening the set of monitors we use by integrating
other sets, more widely distributed or larger, is one of our
main perspectives, see Section VI.
Notice that some PlanetLab monitors may not be suitable
for our needs. For instance, they may experience frequent
shutdowns, or have poor internet connectivity. They may even
filter ICMP (or belong to a network which does so). As
managing these issues before the measurement is very difficult
and subject to errors, we used all the monitors during our
measurement, and discarded those which provided irrelevant
data afterwards.
To construct our list of targets, we randomly sampled
250 000 distinct 32 bit integers (IP-adresses), and sent an ICMP
ECHO REQUEST to each of them. We recorded the 10 000
first addresses which answered to this request. Again, note
that our selected target are not necessarily in the core of the
internet. This does not matter as we do not intend to get an
estimation of the degree distribution, but we are only interested
in illustrating our method.
Finally, we ran our measurement from the 5th to the 6th
of July 2009 as follows. For each monitor, we shuffled the
target list, obtained a few hours before, and generated a shell
script that sends a traceroute every second to each of the
targets, in the given shuffled order. This loop is repeated 10
times by each monitor, following its own shuffled order. Once
all the scripts have been generated, we sent each of them to
the corresponding monitor. Then, we sent a start command to
every monitor. The measurement ended about 30 hours later,
once 90% monitors that had successfully received and started
the script had terminated (some never terminate, mostly due
to shutdowns or errors unrelated to the script itself). The raw
output was then retrieved and analyzed locally.
B. Irrelevant monitors and targets
The first step of our filtering process, which aims at ob-
taining reliable (and complete) data, consists in discarding
monitors and targets that have irrelevant behavior with regard
to our goal.
We say that a traceroute is valid if it reaches its target. As
our targets are supposed to answer to ICMP ECHO REQUEST,
and as we use ICMP traceroute, all traceroutes should in
principle be valid. However, it may happen that the monitor
is unable to conduct the measurement (for instance if it has
no ICMP capabilities) and, more importantly, a target may be
unreachable at some time during the measurement. In our case,
we obtained 36 928 702 valid traceroutes from 544 monitors to
10 000 targets (not all monitors and targets produce the same
number of valid traceroutes) and examined their repartition
among monitors and targets.
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 0  10000  20000  30000  40000  50000  60000  70000  80000
71783
Fig. 4. Cumulative distribution of the number of valid traceroutes per monitor.
Monitors from which we obtain a low number of valid
traceroutes should be discarded. First because they make the
number of monitors used in our inference larger than it actually
is, and because they may parasite the following of the filtering
process. The distribution of the number of valid traceroutes for
each monitor (Figure 4) shows that only 68 monitors out of
544 (∼12%) obtained less than 71 783 valid traceroutes out
of 77 316 (∼92%), which is the maximum number of valid
traceroutes collected by a monitor. We then discarded these
68 monitors and kept only the data from the remaining 476
for the following. According to Section III, this should not
make us loose any data.
Similarly, targets for which we obtain no valid traceroute, or
only few, should be discarded: we have too limited information
 0
 1000
 2000
 3000
 4000
 5000
 6000
 7000
 8000
 9000
 10000
 0  500  1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
3502
Fig. 5. Cumulative distribution of the number of valid traceroutes per target.
A point with coordinates (x, y) means that exactly y monitors (resp. targets)
obtained x valid traceroutes or less.
on them. This is probably due to target shutdowns or network
failures. We will assume that there is no correlation between
this and the target degree. We first removed the 605 targets
obtaining no valid traceroute (this may be due to the fact
that the target are no longer connected at the time of the
measurement), and we plotted the distribution of the number
of valid traceroutes per target (Figure 5). It shows that 2314
targets out of 9395 remaining ones (∼25%) obtained less than
3502 valid traceroutes out of 4760 (∼74%). In the sequel,
we do not consider them anymore and we go on with the
7081 remaining targets. Note that, necessarily, these remaining
targets have been observed by at least 350 different monitors
(since a monitor produces at most 10 valid traceroutes per
destination).
C. Fake neighbors correction
At this point, only traceroutes from 476 monitors to 7 081
targets remain. Thanks to the 10 repetitions of traceroute
between each pair of monitor and target, we can now filter
the part of data that may contain erroneous neighbors. We
showed in Section IV that this mistrustful data comes from
the pairs for which all valid traceroutes have different lengths.
Fortunately, about 75% of them produced constant-length
routes. In order to remove the others from our data, we plotted
the distribution of the number of monitors that produced all
its traceroutes of the same length per target (see Figure 6).
It turns out that only 980 targets out of 7 081 (∼14%) have
less than 350 monitors producing constant-length routes. Then,
we discarded all mistrustful pairs and kept only the 6 101
targets still observed by enough monitors afterwards. Again,
we make the assumption that having routes of different lengths
is independent from target degree.
D. Results
The distribution of the number of neighbor interfaces2
observed for each target in our sample measurement is given in
Figure 7. Let us insist on the fact that this is not an estimation
of any degree distribution: neighbor routers may be counted
2Traceroutes producing a star in last but one position do not give any
neighbor interface of the target in the considered topology, and therefore do
not contribute to the distribution.
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Fig. 6. Cumulative distribution of the number of targets per monitor reached
by constant-length routes. A point with coordinate (x, y) means that exactly
y targets obtained all traceroutes with the same length from x monitors or
less.
several times as we do not recognize different interfaces of a
same router, and the sample contains targets in the border of
the topology (for which we miss some neighbors).
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Fig. 7. Final distribution of the number of neighboring interfaces per target.
Notice however that most targets have a low number of
neighbor interfaces, which is in accordance with domain
knowledge, but that none of them has a very high degree.
Indeed, although our method would underestimate the degrees
of such nodes, simulations show that their order of magnitude
would not change. But the largest value observed in our
measurement is 57, which is itself an upper bound of the
number of neighbor routers (remind that several interfaces may
belong to a same router). This means that there was no high-
degree node in our random sample of 10 000 nodes, and that
such nodes are therefore very rare (much rarer than expected
in a power-law distribution). As a consequence, our method is
appropriate for observation of the vast majority of nodes.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES.
We presented a method to obtain an interface of each
neighbor of a router in the core of the internet. This constitutes
an important step towards precise estimation of the degree
distribution of the IP-level router topology, which is our main
perspective. It now relies on anti-aliasing techniques, thus
increasing significantly the importance of this problem, and
on selection of targets from which to infer the global degree
distribution. Indeed, randomly selecting interfaces does not
lead to random routers selection as the sampling is biased
by the number of interfaces attached to routers. Correction of
this bias is necessary.
Our work also raises several key questions which may be
tackled formally. In particular, one may formally establish the
results we obtain here with simulations, such as the fact that
our approach succeeds in discovering all neighbors of targets,
or the limited impact of the size of the underlying graph, which
we empirically observe here.
Another direction for improving our results is to increase
the number of involved monitors, in order to obtain more
reliable measurements for high-degree nodes (we have seen
that this would not improve results for low-degree nodes).
To that purpose, one may use looking glasses, i.e. websites
providing the possibility to run traceroute measurements
from them (more than one thousand such sites are currently
available), as well as monitors from the DIMES project,
which counts approximately one thousand machines. Notice
that these monitors and those of PlanetLab may be used all
together, and that their number increases rapidly.
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